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Executive Summary
The release of clarified Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guide-
lines and independent changes in consumer behavior provide an
opportunity to study the effects of direct-to-consumer advertising
(DTCA) in the prescription drug market alongside the effects of various
physician-oriented promotions. We examine the effects of DTCA and
detailing for brands in five therapeutic classes of drugs, using monthly
aggregate U.S. data from August 1996 through December 1999. In
terms of impact of DTCA on demand, we provide evidence on two
issues: (1) do increases in DTCA increase the market size of an entire
therapeutic class? and (2) does DTCA increase within-class market
share of advertised drugs? Our findings suggest that, for these classes
of drugs, DTCA has been effective primarily through increasing the
size of the entire class. Overall, we estimate that 13 to 22 percentof
the recent growth in prescription drug spending is attributable to the
effects of DTCA.
Advertisements contain the only truth to be relied on in a newspaper.
Thomas Jefferson1
Advertising is a racket ... itsconstructive contribution to humanity is exactly minus
zero.
F. Scott Fitzgerald1
I think I was wrong. ... Onthe whole, I think there is a lot of educational benefit [to
direct to consumer prescription drug advertising].
David A. Kessler, M.D., former FDA Commissioner22 Rosenthal, Berndt, Donohue, Epstein, and Frank
Since 1994, total spending on consumer-directed promotion forpre-
scription drugs has grown nearly tenfold (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foun-
dation 2000). Consumers and their physicians report that prescription
drug advertisements are increasingly influential. In surveys of consum-
ers, the share of people reporting that they have seen an advertisement
on television or heard an advertisement on the radio for a prescription
drug more than doubled between 1993 and 2000, reaching 81 percent
by 2002 (Alperstein and Peyrot 1993, Newshour with Jim Lehrer/
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation / Harvard School of Public Health
2000, Aikin 2002). Some estimates indicate that as many as 25 percent
of Americans have asked their doctors about a medicationas a result of
seeing an advertisement (Prevention Magazine 2001). Similarly, many
physicians report that their patients have asked them about drugsas
a direct consequence of consumer advertising (Borzo 1997, Kaufman-
Sherr and Hoffman 1997).
The rise of direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) of prescription
drugs represents a departure from the industry's historical concentra-
tion on promotion to physicians, hospitals, and other health careorga-
nizations.3 This phenomenon is highly targeted toward a minority of
products. In one recent study of 391 major branded drugs in 1999, only
18 percent had positive DTCA expenditures, whereas 95 percent of
brands sent "detailers" to visit physicians' offices (Neslin 2001). Tradi-
tional physician-oriented forms of promotion remain important. Even
among those products that employ DTCA, professional promotion
continues to command a larger share of marketing budgets (table 1.1).
The change in marketing mix by pharmaceutical manufacturers is
likely a response to recent changes in market and regulatory condi-
tions.4 Consumers are increasingly seeking active participation in their
own health care, aided in part by the wealth of information available
on the Internet. At the same time, physicians may have less discretion
over choice of brand-name drugs than they once did as a result of direct
and indirect constraints placed on their prescribing behavior by man-
aged care. In addition, in 1997, the FDA released explicit tentative
guidelines (finalized in 1999) regarding advertising to consumers via
electronic media that may have facilitated more widespreaduse of this
promotional strategy. In particular, the new FDA guidelines clarified
the requirements for adequate disclosure of information concerning in-
dications, and risks and effects of a drug, thus removing a major barrier
to television and radio advertising (Rosenthal et al. 2002).Effects of Changes in Prescription Drug Promotion
The release of clarified FDA guidelines and independent changes in
consumer behavior provide an opportunity tostudy the effects of
DTCA in the prescription drug market as well as the effects of various
physician-oriented promotions. In this paper, we examine the effects
of two types of promotional spending for brands in five therapeutic
classes of drugs, and we use monthly aggregate U.S. data from August
1996 through December 1999. Specifically, we provide evidence on two
issues: (1) do increases in DTCA increase the market size of an entire
therapeutic class? and (2) does relative DTCA within a given therapeu-
tic class affect market shares within that therapeuticclass? In both
cases, we examine the effects relative totraditional physician-oriented
promotional efforts.
I.Review of Related Literature
Our research builds on and relates to several other studies. Early eco-
nomic studies of physician-oriented marketing of prescription drugs
by Bond and Lean (1977), Hurwitz and Caves (1988), Leffler(1981),
and Vernon (1981) considered evidence regarding whether thismarket-
ing was more "persuasive" than "informative,"although the distinc-
tion between the two was ambiguous. This distinctionreflects an
earlier, more general literature that viewed advertising alternatively as
changing consumers' preferences (Kaldor 1950), creating or exaggerat-
ing product differentiation and thereby increasing barriers to entry
(Bain 1956), or providing information about a product's characteristics
and its price (Stigler 1961). A common finding from the empirical litera-
ture was that professional promotion of prescriptiondrugs increased
entry costs and decreased price competition byincreasing perceived
product differentiation. A related medical study on physician detailing
by Avorn, Chen and Hartley (1982) advocated that counterdetailingbe
utilized to offset the unbalanced information provided by prescription
drug detailers.5
More recent research by King (2000) on anti-ulcer medications finds
that a brand's own marketing reduces (in absolute value) a brand's
own price-elasticities of demand,but that total industry marketing
(i.e. the sum of marketing expenditures for each brand inthe class) re-
duces the extent of product differentiation. Berndt et al.(1997) dis-
tinguish between "industry expanding" and "rivalrous" marketing


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































06 Rosenthal, Berndt, Donohue, Epstein, and Frank
and physician detailing marketing stocks positively affect own-brand
sales. They also report that the impact of total class marketing efforts
on total class sales is positive, and generally (but not always) declines
with the number of products on the market. Rizzo (1999) reports that
for antthypertensive drugs, both stocks and flows of detailing expendi-
tures decrease the price elasticity through the development of greater
brand loyalty.
Using a proprietary data set from a pharmaceutical manufacturer
that incorporates physician-specific marketing measures forone of its
brands, Manchanda, Chintagunta and Gertzis (2000) find that detailing
has a significant positive impact on the number of prescriptions written
for that drug by the physician; that this marginal impact increases
when free product samples are also provided to the physician; and that,
for the majority of physicians in their sample, diminishing (though still
positive) returns to detailing had already set in. Gonul et al. (2001)
report similar diminishing returns to physician detailing, but find that
detailing and free samples increase price sensitivity, where price is
measured as the average retail price for the drug.
The empirical studies cited above focused on physician detailing and
in some cases on medical journal advertising, but did not examine
DTCA.6 Unlike physician-oriented promotions, to the extent DTCA
might raise awareness among previously untreated consumers of the
existence of potentially effective treatments, DTCA could bringmore
patients into physician offices. Whether the effect of such increased
"physician office foot traffic" is greater on overall therapeutic class
sales, or on the share of sales for the specific brand named in the adver-
tisement, is unclear a priori and is an empirical question addressed in
this study.
Prior to 1997, DTCA was permitted if a medical condition wasmen-
tioned but the brand was not; or if the brand was mentioned, no men-
tion was made of the medical condition for which it was intended, and
instead the ad encouraged the individual to see her or his physician
regarding the brand. Berndt et al. (1995) obtained advertising agency
DTCA data for branded anti-ulcer (H2-antagonist) prescription drugs
through May 1994, along with detailing and medical journal advertis-
ing data from other sources. For the entire IJ2 therapeutic class, adver-
tising demand elasticities were 0.55 for detailing, 0.20 for medical
journal advertising, and 0.01 for this type of DTCA; the sum of these
elasticities is 0.76, suggesting decreasing returns to scale for overall
advertising. Within this therapeutic class, although a brand'sown de-Effects of Changes in Prescription Drug Promotion 7
tailing and medical journal advertising stocks positivelyaffected mar-
ket shares, this was not the case for DTCA.
Two recent studies of DTCA by Wosinska (2001)and Ling, Berndt,
and Kyle (2002) incorporate data after the FDA's 1997clarification
of DTCA guidelines. Using 1996-1999 prescription drug claimsdata
for 4,728 patients who filled a total of 11,529 new prescriptionsfor
cholesterol-reducing drugs in the Blue Shield of California medical
plans, along with national data on physician detailing,samples, and
DTCA, Wosinska finds that DTCA positively affects totaltherapeutic
class sales, but affects an individual brand positively onlyif that brand
has a preferred status on the third-party payer's formulary
Unlike the cholesterol-reducing drugs, the H2-antagonistdrugs are
sold in prescription (Rx) form and, since 1995-1996, also asover-the-
counter (OTC) drugs. Both OTC and Rx versionsof these brands have
utilized DTCA, and thus various spillovers between Rx andOTC
DTCA can be assessed, both between and within brands. Ling,Berndt,
and Kyle find that DTCA marketing of OTC brands has nospillover
to the same brand in the Rx market.Within the Rx market, own-brand
physician-oriented detailing and medical journal advertising efforts
have positive and long-lived effects on own Rxmarket share, while
DTCA of the Rx brand has no significant impact on own Rxmarket
share. Within the OTC market, not only are own-brand effectsof DTCA
on the OTC brand significantly positiveand long-lived, but physician-
oriented Rx marketing efforts have positive own-brandspillovers to
the OTC share. DTCA efforts for Rx brands have nosignificant impact
on same-brand OTC shares.
II.Theoretical Considerations
The codfish lays ten thousand eggs,
The homely hen lays one.
The codfish never cackles
To tell you what she's done.
And so we scorn the codfish,
While the humble hen we prize,
Which only goes to show you
That it pays to advertise.1
The theoretical foundations underlying the economicsof advertis-
ing rely in large part on Dorfman and Steiner (1954),who showed
that for a profit-maximizing monopolist facing adownward-sloping8 Rosenthal, Berndt, Donohue, Epstein, and Frank
linear demand curve, the optimal advertising expenditure to dollar
sales ratio equaled the ratio of two elasticities: EQAthe elasticity of
quantity demanded with respect to advertising efforts, and £QAthe
elasticity of quantity demanded with respect to price (in absolute
value). The equation for this relationship is shown below:
Advertising dollars QA
(1 1 Sales dollars EQP
The Dorfman-Steirier theorem is static because it assumes that adver-
tising efforts last only one time period, but it can be generalized readily
to a dynamic case in which the effects of advertising efforts persist
several periods into the futurethe so-called carryover effects (Schma-
lensee 1972). When there are several marketing instruments (andcon-
stant unit marketing media costs), under reasonable conditions the
optimal ratio of expenditures for any two media equals the ratio of
their marketing elasticities (Palda 1969).
In terms of demand marketing elasticities and advertising-salesra-
tios, it is useful to consider the taxonomy of Nelson (1970, 1974), who
has distinguished search and experience goods as polar opposites. If
a consumer can determine a product's quality and impact prior to pur-
chase merely by visual, tactile, or analytical inspection, the product
is said to have search qualities. Examples of search goods aremany
electronic goods, tools, and credit cards. If a customer mustconsume
the product to predict its quality and impact, the good is said to have
experience qualities. Examples of experience goods include cosmetics,
restaurants, and cereals. In practice precise demarcation of goods into
search versus experience is not possible, particularly when multi-
attribute goods have both search and experience qualities. In general,
however, goods with dominant experience attributes have greater
advertising-sales ratios than do goods with dominant search qualities.
To the extent prescription pharmaceuticals have idiosyncratic andun-
predictable effects (differential efficacy, side effects, and adverse inter-
actions with other drugs), pharmaceuticals would appear to havemore
experience than search qualities. For those pharmaceuticals having
highly predictable outcomes, however, search qualitiesmay dominate.
Carlton and Perloff (1994) suggest that producers of search goodsare
more likely to use informational advertising, while experience goods
producers are more likely to use persuasive advertising. They note,
however, that the division is not perfect, nor is there unanimity in what
constitutes information versus persuasion. They interpret the greaterEffects of Changes in Prescription Drug Promotion 9
advertising-sales ratios of experience goods as possibly reflecting the
fact that "images (used in persuasive advertising) are forgotten more
quickly than facts (used in informative advertising). Thus, consumers
may learn and remember that a particulargood has fewer calories (is
"less filling") in one or a few exposures to an advertisement, butneed
to be bombarded with repeated exposures to beconvinced that a prod-
uct "tastes great."7
The effects of advertising on the welfare of individuals have long
been analyzed and debated. Carlton and Perloff summarize this litera-
hire by stating that "the welfare effects of advertising arecomplex and
depend on the type of product and type of advertising," and therefore
"are generally ambiguous."8 Brand loyalty, for example, mayreduce
price responsiveness of demand, but can also reduce consumers'search
costs.9 Bagwell (2001) provides a useful collection of economics articles
dealing with the theoretical foundations and empirical analyses of ad-
vertising as information versus persuasion; search versus experience;
and the relationships among advertising, product qualityand market
structure.'°
Finally, in addition to affecting demand, advertising can be used as
a strategic tool to affect possible entryinto a product market. Ellison
and Ellison (2000) hypothesize and empirically assess brandedphar-
maceutical firms' advertising strategies in the context of affecting po-
tential generic entry as the brand's patent protection expires.Their
model predicts and they find empirical evidence supporting the notion
that branded drugs with medium-size markets reduce their advertising
intensities to a greater extent prior to patent expiration than do drugs
with either very small or very large markets.
III.The Marketing of Prescription Pharmaceuticals: Descriptive
Data
Pharmaceutical companies currently employ several promotional strat-
egies for prescription drugs designed to target physicians and consum-
ers, respectively (table 1.2). Becausephysicians have long been the key
decision makers when it comes to choosing a prescriptiondrug, phar-
maceutical companies traditionally have concentrated most of their
marketing efforts on physicians, and still do so today. These physician-
oriented marketing efforts include visits or phone calls by pharmaceu-
tical sales representatives to physicians (detailing), free samples,print
advertising, and sponsorship of medical education events. In 2000,the10 Rosenthal, Berndt, Donohue, Epstein, and Frank
Table 1.2
Spending on physician-directed promotion and promotion to sales ratios, 1996-2000
Sources: Physician promotion spending data are from IMS Health, Integrated Promotional
ServicesTM, June 2001; sales data are from Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of America, Annual Survey, 2001; direct-to-consumer promotion spending data are from
IMS Health and Competitive Media Reporting, June 2001.
vast majority of spending on physician-oriented promotion (about 81
percent) was concentrated on detailing (30.6 percent) and samples
(50.6 percent).
Consumer-oriented promotion, which includes advertising in both
print and electronic media, was nearly nonexistent as an approach to
promotion of pharmaceuticals in the United States as of 1980. Begin-
ning in the 1980s and early 1990s, a limited amount of DTCA began
appearing. By 1994 a rapidly increasing trend in DTCA spending
became apparent (figure 1.1). The release of the clarified FDA guide-
lines in 1997 occurred in the midst of this trend and may have accel-
erated it. By 2000, DTCA comprised 15.7 percent of total promotion
expenditures.'1
As shown in table 1.1, there is very substantial heterogeneity in
DTCA and physician-oriented promotion to sales ratios. For new prod-
ucts, this ratio can be as high as 2.05 (Aciphex, a proton pump iiihibi-
tor), and as low as 0.0 (Mevacor, a cholesterol-reducing drug). Within
classes, there is also substantial heterogeneity in DTCA, detailing, and
sampling to dollar sales ratios (e.g., the antidepressants and nasalspray
classes in table 1.1).
Dollars (thousands) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Detailing 3,010 3,365 4,057 4,320 4,803
Journal advertising 459 510 498 470 484
Retail value of samples 4,904 6,047 6,602 7,230 7,954
Total physician promotion 8,373 9,922 11,157 12,020 13,241
Direct-to-consumer promotion 791 1,069 1,317 1,848 2,467
Total Promotion 9,164 10,991 12,474 13,868 15,708
Promotion to sales ratios 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Detailing 0.046 0.047 0.050 0.043 0.043
Journal advertising 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.004
Retail value of samples 0.076 0.084 0.081 0.071 0.071
Total physician promotion 0.129 0.138 0.137 0.118 0.118
Direct-to-consumer promotion 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.018 0.022










Trend in direct to consumer advertising spending, 1994-2000
Source: IMS Health and Competitive Media Reporting
IV.Empirical Implementation
Our aim is to estimate the impact of DTCA on consumer demand for
prescription drugs. The literature on the demand for prescription drugs
uses several approaches to model specification, including implementa-
tion of an almost ideal demand system (AIDS), Cobb-Douglas specifi-
cations, and logit models (Ellison et al. 1997; Rizzo 1999; King 2000;
Ling, Berndt, and Kyle 2002; Frank and Hartman 2002). Each specifica-
tion has its advocates in the literature. None has yet been shown to
be superior in estimating demand models in markets for prescription
drugs.
Following others, in the demand analysis pursued here we estimate
the demand for prescription drug products in the context of multistage
budgeting. That is, we estimate models of the impact of promotional
spending (DTCA and detailing) at the level of the entire therapeutic
class (e.g., selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors [SSRI] antidepres-
sants) and at the level of the individual product within the class (e.g.,
Prozac among the SSR[s).'2 This multistage structure is illustrated in
figure 1.2. At the top level of the tree, which represents the therapeutic
1999 2000







class of drugs, we estimate the impact of DTCA spending and detailing
in the context of a Cobb-Douglas demand specification (double loga-
rithmic). In the analysis of competition at the individual product level
within each class, we specify and estimate three alternative models:
(1) an AIDS type specification; (2) a logit model with log of quantity
share divided by (1 - quantity share) on the left-hand side, and prices
and promotional spending on the right-hand side; and (3) a Cobb-
Douglas model in log levels.
Data Sources
We examine monthly data from August 1996 to December 1999 for
five therapeutic classes of drugs: recent vintage anti-depressants (SSRIs
plus serotonin/norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors [SNR[s}), antthy-
perlipidemics, proton pump inhibitors, nasal sprays, and antihista-
mines (table 1.2). These classes were selected on the basis of the
following criteria: (1) presence of at least one product with high DTCA
expenditures during the time period, (2) within-class variation in
DTCA, and (3) within-class variation in the life cycles of the drugs. The
classes treat a wide variety of ailments, are indicated for different pa-
tient populations, and are prescribed by several different clinical spe-
cialties. Data were collected on all of the drugs in each of these five
classes.
Sales and promotion data for the selected products were obtained
from marketing research firms. Data on DTCA spending were obtained
12 Rosenthal, Berndt, Donohue, Epstein, and FrankEffects of Changes in Prescription Drug Promotion 13
from Competitive Media Reporting (formerly known as Leading
National Advertisers), which tracks local and national advertising
campaigns in major media, such as television and radio, for brands
with at least $25,000 in annual advertising expenditures. Three ma-
jor components of professional promotional spending are reported
here: detailing to office-based physicians, detailing to hospital-based
physicians, and the value of free samples left with physicians. Drug-
specific data on professional journal advertising, which represents a
small percentage of overall promotional expenditures for products in
the six drug classes, was not included.
Spending data on detailing were obtained from Scott-Levin Inc.,
a pharmaceutical market research firm. Scott-Levin imputes spending
on detailing from a panel of roughly 12,000 office- and hospital-based
physicians, which comprises roughly 2-3 percent of the U.S. physician
population. The physicians track their contacts with pharmaceu-
tical sales representatives. Data on the retail value of free samples
provided by pharmaceutical companies were obtained from IMS
Health, which uses a panel of 1,265 front office staff in medical prac-
tices to monitor the volume of samples dropped off by sales repre-
sentatives. Sales data were obtained from Scott-Levin, which audits
over 35,000 retail pharmacies and projects total sales based on
an independent estimate of total U.S. retail sales of prescription
drugs.
Market shares were constructed from product-level data on sales for
the drugs in each of the five classes. Price data were constructed by
Scott-Levin using their sales data. We then created a quantity sold vari-
able based on dividing sales by price for a particular month. Note that
this price variable is not the average consumer copayment for that
drug, but instead is the average price received by wholesalers from
their customers.
Patent information was collected from the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration's Orange Book. A variable was created to indicate the number
of months left on a product's patent. Order of entry within a class was
determined based on the FDA approval date available through the
Orange Book.
Table 1.2 identifies the therapeutic class and individual product com-
binations that are analyzed below. Together these five classes ac-
counted for 30 percent of all DTCA in 1999. Table 1.2 also reports the
year each drug was approved, the three-year average promotion to
sales ratio for detailing, sampling, and DTCA.14 Rosenthal, Berndt, Donohue, Epstein, and Frank
Basic Models
We now set out the basic estimation models used in the analysis. As
noted above, the Cobb-Douglas formulation is used for both the class
level demand model as well as the individual product demand model.
Equation (1.2) is the Cobb-Douglas specification for the product spe-
cific analyses:
in q = a +in DTCA+ 2In Det + (1.2)
where Det is detailing and the X are other explanatory variables.
Equation (1.3) represents the general specification of the modified
AIDS model.
S = a +In () +in DTCA +In Det + (1.3)
where 5, is the dollar revenue share of the ith drug within a therapeutic
class, and P1 and P1 are prices of drugs i and] (in our model, P1 is actually
the share-weighted price index for other competitors in the class, since
there are more than two drugs in every class). Finally, we use the same
regressors in estimating model specifications where the dependent
variable is specified as the logit of quantity shares for the individual
drug products. Several variants of these specifications are also esti-
mated, as discussed below.
Specification and Measurement of Key Variables
There are two important sets of measurement and specification issues
with our demand models of prescription drug promotion: (1) the mea-
surement and specification of the price variables, and (2) the specifica-
tion of promotional spending. The appropriate price to measure in a
traditional consumer demand model is the out-of-pocket cost of the
drug to the consumer. For various reasons, this desired measure is not
available. The Scott-Levin data we analyze measure price as the pay-
ment made by drugstores to wholesalers for each drug. Because this
measure takes into account discounts and charge-backs to pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers, these prices are not simple list prices. Neverthe-
less, these observed prices do not account for the rebates given to health
plans and other third-party payers for prescription drugs, nor the
structure of beneficiary cost sharing for prescription drugs by healthEffects of Changes in Prescription Drug Promotion 15
plans. Both the level of rebates obtained by different payers and the
structure of copayments are quite heterogeneous, even within the cus-
tomers of a single drugstore (Frank 2001). Thus, the observed prices
are measured with error and are probably notclosely correlated with
the desired consumer out-of-pocket price. For these reasons, we take
two approaches in empirical implementation. In one set of models, we
include the mismeasured price variables. In another set of models, we
omit the price variables and instead include a more extensive set of
indicator variables to account for time trends and unobserved cross-
sectional effects.
The specification of measures of promotional spending has generally
taken one of three forms in the literature. Promotion has been treated
as a simple flow variable that is measured by currentlevels of promo-
tional spending (Wosinska 2001). That approach assumes that current
buying behavior depends largely on current exposure to promotional
activities. A second approach specifies promotional activity as affecting
consumer. choice in terms of a lag structure(Rizzo 1999, Wosinska
2001). The assumption here is that the appropriate measure is still
viewed as a flow, only there is a lagged response to the promotional
activities. The third approach is to treat promotional activity as a stock
that depreciates at a constant rate over time (Berndt et al. 1995, 1997).
Our point of departure is to treat promotional spending as a simple
flow. We also explored creating a stock. Our historical data on DTCA
and detailing is quite limited, however. Therefore, we experimented
with a variable based on three-month cumulative spending. When we
used this variable in the specifications, our time series was shortened,
and the resulting parameter estimates did not differ markedly from
those assuming a simple flow. Therefore, we chose to focus on the re-
sults that are based on treating promotional spending as a simple flow.
We account for the possibility that spending on DTCA and physician
promotion and product sales are jointly determined by estimating in-
strumental variables (IV) models where all three variables are assumed
to be endogenous. Three sets of variables serve as the basis for our
exclusion restrictions in the IV specifications for the product specific
demand equations. The first is the time left on the patent for each drug
(and its square). This is based on the notion that for products reaching
the end of their patent protection period, there is little incentive to in-
vest in promotion (Frank and Salkever 1992; Berndt, Kyle, and Ling
2002). The length of the patent life remaining is determined far in ad-
vance of current sales decisions, and there is nodirect effect on sales16 Rosenthal, Berndt, Donohue, Epstein, and Frank
because there is no generic competition yet in place for these drugs.
The second instrument reflects the timing of the FDA's clarification of
the conditions governing direct to consumer advertising on television
(and the interaction of that indicator with time). In 1997 the FDA clari-
fied that television advertisements could refer consumers to a physi-
cian, a 1-800 number, a manufacturer's web site, and a magazine article
that provides the full description of the drugs as required by labeling
regulations. This clarification served to reduce the cost of airing a tele-
vision promotional spot but should not have had a direct impact on
sales. The third instrument is the interpolated monthly value of televi-
sion advertising costs per minute, based on annual data from Robert
M. Coen Associates.
The IV model for DTCA is estimated using a two-part model. The
first stage is a logit of whether there was any spending on DTCA in a
given month, and the second stage is a regression model on the natural
log of DTCA conditional on any spending (Cragg 1971, Duan et al.
1983). For detailing, a simple two-stage IV was estimated because all
drugs in the sample were promoted via detailing.
Finally, we experiment with several specifications of a time effect.
We use a combination of quarterly dummy variables to capture sea-
sonal effects, and a quadratic time trend to account for secular trends in
the pharmaceutical marketplace. All models estimate standard errors
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering.
V.Econometric Results
We begin by presenting results in table 1.3 for the top of the tree struc-
ture in figure 1.2, the class level quantity equations. Three specifications
of the Cobb-Douglas functional form are reported. They differ ac-
cording to whether a monthly time trend was included in the model
(only in colunm 3) and whether interaction effects between drug class
and quarter were included (only in column 3). Overall, the models fit
the data well with R2 statistics of 0.60 to 0.95.
The estimated elasticities of DTCA and detailing are quite stable
across model specifications. For spending on DTCA, the estimated elas-
ticity ranges from 0096 to Q.114. All estimates are very precise, with
i-statistics of about 10. The results suggest that a 10 percent increase
in DTCA spending would result in approximately a 1 percent increase
in sales, other things being equal.Effects of Changes in Prescription Drug Promotion 17
Table 1.3
Drug class demand models
a Robust SE in parentheses.
"Endogenous, IV estimated.
The case of proton pump inhibitors (PPIs) offers insights into the
implications of this result. Between 1998 and 1999, PPI class sales grew
from $4.2 billion to $5.7 billion, a change of nearly 36 percent. During
the same period, DTCA spending for PPI products grew from $49.7
million to $80.1 million, an increase of 60 percent. Using an elasticity
of 0.10 (based on the results reported above) suggests that about 6 per-
centage points of the growth in PPI spending is directly attributable
to DTCA. That translates into $252 million in sales, or about 17 percent
of the sales increase from 1998 to 1999. Note that the increase in PPI
sales directly attributable to increased DTCA is about 8.3 times the in-
crease in DTCA ($252 versus $30.4 million).
For the case of nasal sprays, DTCA spending grew by 37 percent be-
tween 1998 and 1999 (from $83 to $115.2 million). The corresponding
growth in sales was from $726 million to $990 million, or 36 percent. The
elasticity estimate suggests that the growth in DTCA spending was re-
sponsible for a 3.7 percent growth in sales, or 10.3 percent of the total
growth in sáles That amOunts' to abOut $26 million. Here the sales in-
crease directly attributable to increased DTCA spending is only 0.8 times
the DTCA increase ($26 versus $32.2 million). Industry officials have
suggested to us that their targeted changes in sales are in the range of
Dependent variablea
lnQ lnQ lnQ
Class DTCb 0.114 0.099 0.096
(0.01) (0.01) (0.009)
Class detail' 0.017 0.034 0.031
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Quarter dummies Included Included Included
Class dummies Included No No
Interaction Included No No
Month No No Included
Month2 No No Included
Constant 10.02 9.92 9.89
(0.18) (0.19) (0.20)
R2 0.95 0.60 0.62
Equation F 280.0 56.0 48.8718 Rosenthal, Berndt, Donohue, Epstein, and Frank
four to five times the change in DTCA spending at the brand level (in-
creased sales are also associated with increased production costs, sales
commissions, licensing fees, and general administrative costs).
The coefficient estimates for the impact of detailing on sales imply
elasticity estimates between 0.017 and 0.034. Again all three estimates
are estimated quite precisely with t-statistics ranging from 4.25 to about
10. Because changes in detailing were on the order of 7 to 15 percent
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the impact of growth in detailing on
class sales is considerably smaller than it was for drugs using DTCA
as a key promotional strategy. Thus, at the entire class level, for these
therapeutic classes DTCA has a larger marketing elasticity than does
detailing.
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 present the product-specific demand models. All
product-specific models include class fixed effects. Table 1.4 presents
Table 1.4
Individual product demand models with pricesa
a Robust SE in parentheses.
bEndogenous, IV estimated.
Dependent variable
Dollar share ln[(Q share)/(1 - Q share)} In Q
Constant -0.281 -9.971 1.544
(0.88) (4.66) (4.23)
In DTCAb 0.025 0.091 0.071
(0.03) (0.11) (0.11)
in Det" 0.004 0.690 0.730
(0.14) (0.698) (0.63)
Order entry 0.127 0.619 0.615
(0.69) (0.49) (0.49)
(Order entry)2 -0.017 -0.087 -0.089
(0.009) (0.09) (0.09)
in 0.129 1.120 1.108
(0.07) (0.41) (0.39)
Class durnniies Included Included Included
Month -0.0004 -0.171 0.042
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Month2 0.720 0.0022 -0.0007
(0.88) (0.0003) (0.0004)
R2 0.54 0.65 0.69
Equation F 16.51 54.99 34.97Effects of Changes in Prescription Drug Promotion 19
Table 1.5
Individual product demand models with price excluded as regressora
aRobust SE in parentheses.
bEndogenous, IV estimated.
results for models where a relative price measure is included as a right-
side regressor. Table 1.5 omits the relative price measure and instead
includes quarterly dummy variables and interactions between quarter
and class. The quarters are meant to account for seasonal effects and the
fact that these might vary for different classes (antihistamines versus
antidepressants). All six sets of estimates presented treat detailing and
DTCA as endogenous. (One finding worthy of note in the first-stage
regressions is that the impact of the 1997 FDA clarification on reg-
ulations governing DTCA had no significant effect on DTCA spending
levels.)
TV estimates of the coefficient on the price variable in table 1.4 are
positive, significant in two of the three models, and of the wrong sign.
As noted earlier, we believe the price variable is measured with error,
and has no close relationship to patient copayments.
Dependent variable
Dollar Share ln[(Q share)/(1 - Q share)] In Q
Constant 1.746 -9.771 4.413
(1.29) (10.58) (10.79)
In DTCAb 0.077 0.167 0.216
(0.04) (0.23) (0.24)
In Det1' -0.254 0.77 0.443
(0.18) (1.43) (1.46)
Order entry 0.100 0.269 0.313
(0.06) (0.62) (0.61)
(Order entry)2 -0.011 -0.067 -0.071
(0.01) (0.10) (0.10)
Class dummies Included Included Included
Quarter dummies Included Included Included
Interaction Included Included Included
Month -0.007 -0.181 0.026
(0.004) (0.04) (0.03)
Month2 0.0001 0.002 -0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0009) (0.001)
R2 0.37 0.47 0.52
Equation F 24.42 51.86 17.9620 Rosenthal, Berndt, Donohue, Epstein, and Frank
The various models in tables 1.4 and 1.5 yield relatively consistent
findings with respect to the estimates for the effect of DTCA and detail-
ing on individual product sales. The coefficient estimates for the log
of DTCA are consistently positive and estimated imprecisely. In five
of six specifications, the standard errors are larger than the estimated
coefficient. In the first column of table 1.5, the estimated coefficient has
a t-statistic of 1.92 that is not quite significantly different from zero at
conventional levels. The estimated DTCA elasticities are not consistent
in magnitude across the estimated models, nor in levels versus shares.
To the extent DTCA affects class sales, one would expect a larger level
elasticity (colunm 3) than a share elasticity (columns 1 and 2). This is
not always the case. However, the Cobb-Douglas model in table 1.5
yields an elasticity of about 0.22, larger than the share elasticity.
The results for the impact of detailing on sales for individual drugs
show coefficient estimates that are typically positive and imprecisely
estimated. The first column of table 1.5 reports a negative coefficient
estimate for the log of detailing variable, but this coefficient is not sig-
nificantly different from zero at conventional levels. Although the de-
tailing elasticity estimates are all larger than those for DTCA, the
detailing elasticity estimates never approach statistical significance.
Order of entry and its square were never found to be significantly
different from zero in any of the estimated models. The magnitudes
of the DTCA and detailing coefficients in the product-level models are
quite sensitive to the form of the dependent variable and to the mariner
in which time dummies are specified. Finally, we also estimated a vari-
ant of the Cobb-Douglas model where both own DTCA and competitor
DTCA levels were specified as right-side variables. The results were
not materially different from those reported in tables 1.4 and 1.5. The
time trend results for the share regressions reflect therapeutic competi-
tion because they tend to be negative for most of the observed period
as the number of competitors increases. The quantity regression reflects
the growth in the class over time and this is a generally positive time
trend.
VI.Comments on Results
The DTCA parameter estimates we obtained at the entire therapeutic
class level are both quite robust and relatively precisely estimated. Esti-
mates of the detailing elasticities at the entire therapeutic class levelEffects of Changes in Prescription Drug Promotion 21
are also positive and significant, generally smaller than the DTCA elas-
ticities, and not quite as robust. In contrast, both DTCA and detailing
parameter estimates for the individual product demand models are
neither robust nor precisely estimated.
Nonetheless, we believe it is premature to conclude that DTCA af-
fects only class level sales and not individual product sales. The stabil-
ity of both DTCA and detailing spending is far greater at the class level
than at the individual product level, and thus the product level de-
mand models may not be capturing properly the complex timing rela-
tionships between marketing efforts arid measured sales, particularly
since the latter involve sales to drugstores, not from drugstores to pa-
tients. However, the three-month cumulative log formulation gave
similar results, even though it was less volatile than the current flow
measure. The greater stability at the class level gives us some confi-
dence in the class level results.
One potential reason for the instability of results at the product level
is the experimentation with DTCA. One implication is that such trial-
and-error spending might wash out the product-level effects but not
the class-level effects. Thus, spending on DTCA may fail to increase
one's own demand, but still increase class demand. We view the ques-
tion of the impact of DTCA spending at the individual product level
as still remaining quite uncertain, a topic that merits additional
research. If our class and product share results stand up after add-
itional research, they could have an interesting implication. Specifi-
cally, these findings are consistent with the notion that DTCA brings
previously untreated patients into physicians' offices where they re-
ceive a prescription for a product in the advertised class of drugs. How
physicians balance their own product preferences and those of con-
sumers is less certain. Thus, DTCA might positively affect class sales,
but possibly not within-class product shares. Whether such addi-
tional prescribing at the class level is medically appropriate (a key
question for public health) is, of course, beyond the scope of the present
analysis.
This interpretation of our DTCA findings is consistent with the
microeconomic evidence reported by Wosinska (2001) for cholesterol-
reducing medications. She finds that DTCA, unlike detailing, affects
individual drug market share only if that brand happens to have pre-
ferred status on the third-party payer's formulary. It is also consistent
with evidence from Ling, Berndt, and Kyle (2002), who find that, for22 Rosenthal, Berndt, Donohue, Epstein, and Frank
the H2-antagonists, there is no significant spillover impact on same-
brand Rx market share, nor does DTCA on the Rx brand affect Rx mar-
ket share, although DTCA on over-the-counter (OTC) brands has a
positive impact on own-brand OTC market share.
Finally, we considered the overall impact on prescription drug
spending of the growth in DTCA. We examined 1999 and 2000 DTCA
spending and sales for the 25 largest therapeutic classes, which account
for about 70 percent of total prescription drug spending. We applied
our 0.10 elasticity only to those classes with DTCA activity but aggre-
gated the effects in two ways. First, we applied the elasticity class by
class and totaled the class-level effects. Because there were some cases
where DTCA growth resulted in estimates out of range (we overpre-
dicted sales growth) as well as some instances of DTCA spending de-
clines, we also applied our average elasticity to total DTCA spending
growth for those classes that advertise and multiplied this figure by
1999 sales for those classes. The absolute change in sales attributable
to DTCA was then compared to the total growth in prescription drug
sales. The two different aggregation approaches yielded estimates of
DTCA-attributable spending growth of 22 percent and 13 percent, re-
spectively, of total prescription drug spending growth. Thus, our esti-
mates indicate that DTCA is important, but is not the primary driver
of recent growth.
Notes
Financial support from the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation is gratefully acknowl-
edged. We are also grateful to Alan Garber, Joseph Newhouse, Ariel Pakes, Alvin Silk,
and participants in the NEER Health Care Economics Program Meeting for helpful
suggestions.
These quotes are from Carlton and Perloff (1994), P. 604.
As quoted in the Boston Globe (Mishra 2002). Words in brackets added for clarifi-
cation.
However, DTCA dominated drug advertising prior to the 1938 FDA prescription-only
legislation and the 1951 Humphrey-Durham Amendment to the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act that established physicians as "learned intermediaries" and made many
drugs available only with a physician's prescription. Temin (1980, pp. 82-87) estimates
that in 1930, 90 percent of drug advertising expenditures occurred in newspapers and
popular magazines; only 2 percent in technical journals; and only 3 percent involved
detailing, samples, and other.
For an historical account of DTCA controversies, see Masson (1991).
See also Ziegler, Lew, and Singer (1995).Effects of Changes in Prescription Drug Promotion 23
Twenty-five years of experience in modeling the impact of detailing on sales,and on
optimizing sales force size and targets, is summarized in Sinha and Zoitners(2001). A
classic study of detailing is written by Lodish et al. (1988).
Canton and Perloff (1994), p. 603.
Canton and Perloff (1994), p. 625.
For empirical evidence on consumers' search costs for acute versuschronic medica-
tions, and impact on retail pricing of drugs, see Sorenson (2000).
See also Scherer (2000).
Industry officials tell us that absolute levels of DTCA spending are likely to be over-
stated because Competitive Media Reporting estimates DTCA spending using"list"
rather than actual transaction prices. Because of the large amount of advertising services
pharmaceutical firms purchase, they typically obtain substantial discounts off list prices.
These industry officials suggest that the DTCA estimates by CompetitiveMedia Re-
porting are reasonably reliable estimates of relative DTCA across drugs.
We also estimate a variant of the strict two-stage budgeting model where weallow
both class level DTCA and own DTCA to affect the demand for a particulardrug.
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